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Abstract. Does the increasing politicisation of Europe signify a step towards the legitimation of the Union?
This could be the case if the increased public intensity of debate and polarisation of opinion brought about
by politicisation do not fragment the audience and if arguments presented in public are sufficiently clear
about the desired nature of the polity. To answer this question, the focus of this article is on dynamic
contestation in the public sphere using original data of news platforms and political blogs in 12 EU Member
States and transnational websites during the European Parliament election campaign of 2009. The results
are, first, that diffuse eurosceptic evaluations dominate public debates despite large variation in the intensity
of debate across Member States. Second, a majority of evaluations made, particularly those by citizens
leaving comments online, are negative in all countries included in this study. A gap between elites and
citizens persists, but it appears less pronounced than often proclaimed in the literature. And third, democ-
racy is a primary concern in EU polity contestation, especially for those evaluating the EU negatively.
Although little evidence is found of a fragmentation of audiences, the prominence of diffuse euroscepticism
poses a major challenge to legitimation of the Union.
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Introduction
Political contestation has placed the problem of the legitimacy of the European Union
(EU) in a new light. It is now widely debated in the broader public sphere of every Member
State whether the EU is legitimate (Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Koopmans & Statham 2010;
Risse 2010). Decisions in EU framework are closely scrutinised and questioned by the
media (e.g., Boomgaarden et al. 2013), the public and national parliaments (e.g., Winzen
2012). Hence, EU issues have profound impact on politics at the national and EU levels.
Political conflicts concerning European integration have intensified and mobilised a wide
range of actors including political parties, social movements, interest groups and citizens
(Hooghe & Marks 2009; Statham & Trenz 2013). This process of ‘politicisation’ (De Wilde
2011) entails a polarisation of opinions and viewpoints. As different ideas and opinions
meet in public debate, the audience is exposed to the various arguments and could poten-
tially be persuaded in various directions. While politicisation thus features disagreement, it
could simultaneously signify a process towards reaching a new (or old) consensus. As long
as audiences are not fragmented to the point of being exposed to like-minded people only
(Dahlgren 2009) and arguments about European integration and the EU are made with
sufficient clarity about what exactly is demanded and why (Morgan 2005), politicisation can
function as a process supporting the legitimation rather than delegitimation of the EU
polity (Rauh & Zürn 2013).
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To assess politicisation’s potential for legitimation, we proceed to map the extent to
which publics are exposed to various arguments and the extent to which such arguments are
sufficiently complete concerning what is demanded and why. Based on original data from
online media platforms in 12 EU Member States during the 2009 European Parliament
(EP) elections, we show that publics are sufficiently interconnected as each Member State
features similar plurality in articulated opinions, but that the most prominent line of
argument is not clear enough about what the EU should look like. Although it is clear that
the makers of such arguments are dissatisfied with the EU, it remains unclear what would
alleviate this dissatisfaction. This form of ‘diffuse euroscepticism’ is widespread and pre-
sents a serious challenge to the legitimation of the EU.
EU polity contestation in the public sphere
Research on the politicisation of European integration (De Wilde 2011; De Wilde & Zürn
2012; Hooghe & Marks 2009; Rauh 2012; Statham & Trenz 2013) draws our attention to the
process and status of increasing societal conflict about what the EU as a polity is, how much
power it should have in what fields, and where the political project of European integration
should eventually lead. No longer the exclusive prerogative of elite executive actors, Euro-
pean politics are now shaped by a range of societal forces, including public opinion, mass
media, political parties, interest groups and social movements. In this new context, griev-
ances are articulated and reconstructed by political entrepreneurs in the public sphere. As
such, mass media functions as the main locus where contestation takes place and where
public opinion about Europe is formed (Statham & Trenz 2013).
The origins of politicisation are sought in the increasing level, scope and inclusiveness of
the EU itself (De Wilde & Zürn 2012) – that is, exactly because the EU has become so
influential, its powers and constitutional make-up become the focus of public attention.
What is more, while European integration provokes societal contestation, the process of
politicisation increasingly constrains future choices of integration. Whereas early theorists
expected societal forces to be pro-integrationist and to demand a fully-fledged federal
Europe (Schmitter 1969), recent research points to politicisation as a brake on integration,
as citizens turn out to be more sceptical about the EU than elites (Hooghe & Marks 2009).
Politicisation further highlights the importance of identity for EU politics (Checkel &
Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010). The elusiveness of a European identity means many citizens
feel decisions ought to be made at the national level, rather than in Brussels, to reflect the
will and collective freedom of their national community. In the process of the unfinished
constitutionalisation of the EU, the debate on the impact of politicisation includes the
normative dimension of how desirable popular contestation is and whether it should be
promoted or avoided (Føllesdal & Hix 2006; Hix & Bartolini 2006; Moravcsik 2006; Zürn
2006). Critics point especially to the different understandings and narratives that exist
between Member States about the purpose, meaning and finality of European integration
(Diez Medrano 2003) as well as the persistent gap between elites and citizens, with the
latter being much less enthusiastic about the European project (Binnema & Crum 2007;
Ross 2008; Wessels 1995). Both point to a degree of fragmentation of audiences, with
divisions between elite and mass audiences and between audiences of different nationality.
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Such fragmentation of audiences endangers the legitimation of the polity as it becomes
difficult to design the EU in such a way as to command acceptance from everyone, or even
from a majority (Dahlgren 2009).
Although the normative potential of politicisation remains debated in academic circles,
both advocates and opponents agree that politicisation could be beneficial as long as a basic
common ground is reached about the nature of the EU polity and its founding community
(Papadopoulos & Magnette 2010). Such a common ground can only come into existence if
there is a free and rational exchange of arguments in the public sphere, with equal access to
the debate for all (Eder & Kantner 2000; Habermas 1985). This brings us back to the
question of whether politicisation functions to expose Europeans to a variety of views, thus
connecting them to a singular debate, or whether it fragments audiences across Europe. It
also brings us back to the question of whether the positions brought to the fore in the
process of politicisation provide sufficient rationale about what could provide the building
blocks for a legitimate European Union.
Public opinion research on European integration tends to centre on the data available
through Eurobarometer surveys (e.g., Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Lubbers & Scheepers 2005;
McLaren 2007). Yet, Eurobarometer has been criticised for posing questions that are not
related to the respondents’ lifeworld perceptions and experiences (Eder 2011). Besides
survey data, we also have extensive knowledge on the types and degrees of party positions
on Europe (Kopecký & Mudde 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008a, 2008b). Yet, there is
much less information on how and to what extent these party positions are communicated
through the public sphere (but see Kriesi (2007) and Statham and Koopmans (2009)).What
is more, studies of ‘supply side’ and ‘demand side’ of public opinion are challenged by the
increasing saliency of Europe in the ‘marketplace’ of the public sphere, as brought about by
politicisation (De Vreese 2007; Koopmans & Statham 2010; Kriesi 2007; Statham & Trenz
2013). Survey analysis and party position measurements should therefore be comple-
mented by studies of Europe’s public spheres, especially in light of complex demands on
how the political project of European integration and the EU polity ought to be publicly
justified (Morgan 2005) and the highly idiosyncratic shape of national discourses (Diez
Medrano 2003).
To complement existing studies on public opinion based on survey data and offline mass
media, we focus on the micro level of opinion formation in online media. Although dis-
crepancies between public opinion as measured through surveys and public opinion as
expressed in online media remain, there is no denying the opinion formation function of
mass media both generally (Gamson & Modigliani 1989) and concerning European inte-
gration specifically (De Vreese 2007). The focus shifts from non-articulated and isolated
attitudes on European integration to targeted, publicly articulated and frequently justified
statements as elements of the ongoing public discourse on the EU.
We draw upon Morgan (2005) to conceptualise three different dimensions of the EU
that ought to be evaluated in order to provide a ‘full’ or complete evaluation of the
legitimacy of the EU polity. Only such full evaluations provide sufficient information to
argue for a transformation of the European Union. This is so, because
the goal of at least some eurosceptics to abolish the EU is no less far-reaching than
the project of at least some European federalists to establish a ‘superstate’. If the
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arguments of these federalists must meet strict justificatory standards, because their
goals are so transformative, the arguments of eurosceptics must meet strict
justificatory standards too (Morgan 2005: 31)
The composition of arguments and justifications should be organised in such a way that it
shows (a) whether the principle of transnational integration is defendable (are we better off
doing things together?), (b) whether the institutional arrangement fits (is there a justifiable
institutional framework that guarantees the general compliance with the principle?) and (c)
whether the project is ideationally or materially supported (are there shared goals that
drive the process of future integration?). This leads to the following typology of sufficiently
complete forms of EU polity evaluation.
A combination of positive evaluations of all three dimensions can be labeled ‘affirmative
European’ while its exact opposite is ‘anti-European’ (see Table 1). In between we find
‘Status quo’ and ‘eurocritical’ arguments. Not falling neatly into this ordinal scale are
‘alter-European’ and ‘pragmatic’ arguments that combine the counter-intuitive combina-
tion of negative evaluations of the EU polity with positive evaluations of future integration
(alter-Europeanism) or negative evaluations of the principle of integration combined with
a resignation to accept the EU as it is (pragmatism). Any of these six types of EU polity
contestation would meet the discursive criteria of providing a complete evaluation of EU
legitimacy in terms of justifying the ‘polity worth’ of the EU in all the three dimensions
identified above. Yet, the actual practice of debating Europe does not always meet this
argumentative strength and a separate category of incomplete polity contestation – ‘diffuse
euroscepticism’ – must be conceptualised to capture stand-alone negative evaluations of
the institutional set-up or project of integration without specification of preferences regard-
ing the other two dimensions. Drawing on the conceptualisation of different economies of
worth – ideological constructs based in normative theories about the common good
(Boltanski & Thévenot 2006) – this variety of EU polity evaluations can be justified based
on principles of democracy, necessity, economic prosperity, culture or safety.
We do not expect politicisation to generate consensus across Europe on one of these six
forms of polity evaluation. Rather, the increased saliency of the EU polity in some parts of
Europe’s public spheres is theorised to resonate in other parts.Diffusion takes place through
public monitoring or direct exchange of arguments about problems of common concern.As
Table 1. Typology of complete EU polity evaluations
Principle of integration
Positive Negative
EU institutional set-up
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Project of integration Positive Affirmative
European
Alter-European – –
Negative Status quo Eurocritical Pragmatic Anti-European
Source: De Wilde and Trenz (2012).
CONVERGING ON EUROSCEPTICISM 769
© 2014 European Consortium for Political Research
dissensus draws media attention and crystalises opinion, patterns of conflict are replicated
over time and space. Conflicts are also increasingly found to structure the European political
space in terms of stable cleavages and group polarisation along ideological or identity lines
(Kriesi et al. 2008). Such conflicts can have a social ordering function and as such integrate
the formerly fragmented European political space (Trenz 2005: 71). Polarisation facilitates
social orientation also in the sense of positioning different actors and their divergent
preferences. The Europeanised public spheres proliferate not through the consonances of
unified discourse and understanding, but through the resonances of diverging opinions and
conflicts (Eder & Trenz 2003). Polarisation of opinion is therefore a necessary component of
politicisation (De Wilde 2011: 567). Differences of opinion are thus likely to reproduce
themselves through the mass media and resonate within the European public space. If
audiences and participants of different public spheres sufficiently overlap, conflicts about
Europe are transmitted from one forum to the other leading to a (limited) Europeanisation
of public spheres (Koopmans & Erbe 2004).Such a situation would mean that fragmentation
between elites and masses and between different Member States is avoided. To find out
whether there is evidence of such a structuring effect on public opinion as a result of
mediated conflicts about European integration is a main aim of this article.
We can expect conflicting visions to exist in three dimensions. First, there are differences
of public opinion on European integration across Member States. There are more enthu-
siastic and more ‘awkward’ partners in the European project. Politicians and citizens in
some of the founding Member States have long advocated a fully federal European Union
while those in newer Member States tend to be more sceptical. Some Member States –
notably the United Kingdom – continue to debate whether they want to be a member of
this project at all (Fuchs et al. 2009; Harmsen & Spiering 2004). Second, a gap between
citizens and political elites has been reported. Elites throughout Europe tend to support the
integration project more than their constituencies do as evidenced during referendums,
when vast majorities of elected politicians advocate closer integration while only small
majorities or minorities of citizens agree with them (Aarts & Van der Kolk 2006; Binnema
& Crum 2007; Hobolt 2009). Third, there appears to be differences of understanding both
within and across Member States about the underlying purposes of integration, ranging
from safeguarding peace, to modernisation, to creating jobs and economic growth (Diez
Medrano 2003; Harmsen & Spiering 2004). Especially, supporters and opponents of Euro-
pean integration appear to use different benchmarks by which to evaluate EU performance
(Helbling et al. 2010), hence not engaging each other directly. If politicisation brings about
an equal diffusion of the different positions and justifications across different national
publics and elite and mass publics, it links these audiences to a similar debate. In this way,
politicisation can signify a process toward legitimation of the EU. If, however, audiences are
exposed to a limited sub-set of positions and justifications only, such a legitimation potential
of politicisation cannot be expected.
Data and method
To capture interactive public opinion formation regarding the EU polity, we target debates
on the Internet in a comparative research design.1 Professional news websites and political
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blogs increasingly offer readers the opportunity to respond to published texts in comments,
frequently giving rise to lively discussions online. Political intermediation through the
so-called ‘traditional media’ (newspapers, television, radio) is found to be limited in many
ways. It is inherently linear, highly selective and exclusive in the sense that citizens remain,
with few exceptions, mere observers of the political game. In the case of the EU, the
traditional media have also repeatedly been found to re-affirm the nation-state and the
legitimacy of contextualised national politics (Trenz 2004). We argue that the online media
offers an ideal environment for analysing contestation of the EU precisely because they
allow us to systematically link political contestation and citizens’ participation with public
salience and media framing (cf. Michailidou and Trenz 2010).
In order to identify our sample population, we followed Schneider and Foot’s definition
of a web sphere as ‘a hyperlinked set of dynamically defined digital resources that span
multiple websites and are deemed relevant, or related, to a central theme or “object” ’
(Schneider & Foot 2004: 118). In such web spheres, one big event or chain of events (in our
case, the EP elections of 2009) may trigger a series of inter-actor and inter-site activity
online known as ‘web storms’ (Schneider & Foot 2005: 162–163). Media coverage of the EP
election campaign peaks in the three weeks before the election dates up until several days
after the last elections (Schuck et al. 2011). Our monitoring period was thus limited from 18
May 2009 until 10 June 2009.
The sample comprises only the most popular web spaces per country and at trans-
European level. In total, we have included 36 professional journalism websites and 24
independent blogs of national scope, while at European/transnational level we have
included one professional journalism website and two blogs.2 To supplement our data from
the transnational news websites, which attract a niche, arguably elite, audience, with data
from more popular, less elitist online forums, we also included two Twitter threads with EU
election-related hash tags. For the same reason, we decided to include two Facebook groups
and one ‘fan page’ focused on the EU elections as sources of online debate, even though
they do not fall within our definition of the online news media sphere. The selected
Facebook sources came up during the analysis of in-linking and out-linking patterns of the
trans-European news websites. The EP fan page (not to be confused with the official EP
Facebook page) counted over 55,000 members at the time of the sampling (see Online
Appendix for details), while the two groups were set up specifically for the 2009 elections
and counted 5,953 and 2,719 members, respectively.
It is in the application of a rigorous quantitative content analysis to cross-country
Internet data that our methodology is highly innovative. Relatively few studies have so far
targeted news websites and political blogs in multiple countries in such a manner (but see
Jankowski and Van Selm (2008) and Strandberg (2008)). Researchers have thus far
deployed a multitude of deliberative communication models devised to assess online politi-
cal debates (Surel 2000; Trenz 2009). However, the abstract nature of the subject of meas-
urement (deliberation) and the complexity of the models reduce both the comparability of
the results and the reliability of the measurements. This is primarily because these models
allow for high levels of inter-/intra-coder bias and arbitrary interpretations of the partici-
pants’ intentions. Instead, we focus on the content found in selected threads of specifically
chosen websites, thus conducting a form of discourse analysis of the web at micro
level (Schneider & Foot 2004, 2005). To capture individual contributions to EU polity
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contestation, we operationalised the unit of analysis as a ‘message’, which is defined as one
or more evaluations on European integration made by a single (collective) actor in a single
time and space. When coding a message, we identify first who transmits it (EU, foreign
and/or domestic actors, state and non-state actors, citizens, journalists and/or politicians).
We then record the kinds of evaluations a message contains of the EU polity. This entails
the coding of message along one, two or all three of the following dimensions: principle of
European integration, institutional set-up of the EU and project of integration. An evalu-
ation can be positive or negative and, in the latter two dimensions, it can further address the
level, scope or inclusiveness of integration (see the Online Appendix). Finally, we code the
justification given, if any, by the actor for the presented evaluations of EU legitimacy.
An example of a message containing multiple evaluations is ‘European integration is
undemocratic and the EU should therefore be abolished’.This example contains a negative
evaluation of the principle of integration and of the current institutional set-up of the EU.
We can safely classify this statement as ‘anti-European’ despite missing information on the
future project or trajectory of integration. Yet, apart from the six complete types of EU
polity evaluation identified above, our analysis also points out a number of truncated
evaluations, which remain under-specified. Statements like ‘the Common Market disman-
tles the welfare state’ or ‘EU enlargement is a threat to security’ clearly express dissatis-
faction in some form with the EU, yet do not specify the full extent of this dissatisfaction nor
possible remedies.We do not know whether the maker of the first example wants to abolish
the Common Market or modify it in such a way as to rescue the welfare state. We also do
not know whether the maker of the second example appreciates the EU without enlarge-
ment or does not appreciate the EU at all. Such truncated evaluations thus do not meet the
criteria of a sufficient argument justifying a transformation of the EU polity and therefore
fall into a seventh group of polity evaluations, which we label ‘diffuse euroscepticism’.
To operationalise justification, we draw upon the classification of justifications as econo-
mies of worth developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). Accordingly, the legitimacy of
the EU can be defended on the basis of claims that (1) European integration increases
democracy; (2) European integration serves the purpose of preserving a shared cultural
heritage and Europe-wide shared values; (3) European integration is necessary to cope with
modern policy problems or in light of previous commitments; (4) European integration
increases prosperity through stimulating economic growth and general welfare; or (5)
European integration is regarded as protecting Europe from internal and/or external threats
of various nature. On the same principles, the legitimacy of the EU can be denounced.
We therefore assume that the register of justifications of European integration on which
situated actors can draw is limited and that critical practices follow particular scripts and
guidelines, which are de-contextualised and generalised as part of the cultural repertoire of
modern societies (Wagner 2008).Yet, by including the category ‘other’ it was acknowledged
that particular justifications could fall outside of this matrix. Following this matrix, justifi-
cations were coded as the explicit reasons given by the actor of the message for his or her
evaluation. The key factor here is not the action of the maker of an argument, but the
message that reaches the audience. Thus, if a message transmits a common value based on
which the contribution inclines the audience to consider European integration and/or the
EU in connection to the evaluation presented, we would code this as a justification of
worth.
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Linked to this, we have to stress that our classification of EU polity ‘messages’ according
to justification of worth does not aim to assess the deliberative quality of these messages.3
In the tradition of an empirical sociology of critique as formulated by Boltanski and
Thévenot (2006), we rather want to map out the type of views put forward by diverse actors
in the online public sphere regarding the EU polity.We are thus not interested in individual
attitudes as, for instance, measured through questionnaires but in the critical discourse that
unfolds through the exchange of arguments and justifications and that is uttered and
amplified through the media. The mediated contestation of arguments about the scope and
viability of European integration stands in this sense for a dynamic formation of public
opinion in which the ‘polity worth’ of the EU is given meaning and classified.
We used Krippendorff’s alpha to measure inter-coder reliability before, during and at
the end of the coding period (eight coders were involved). For the test, a sub sample of
threads from United Kingdom-based websites was used, as all coders had sufficient grasp of
the English language. All variables had a score of 0.7 and higher, with the exception of the
EU polity evaluation, where the score was 0.628. Although this is slightly below the usually
recommended minimum measurement of alpha (0.667), we have accepted it as valid and
reliable score as the actual coding practice was continuously discussed within the group,
providing for higher reliability than the formal test would lead to assume.
Findings
Positive contributions to EU polity contestation in one or several dimensions – affirmative
European, status quo, alter-European, eurocritical and pragmatic contributions – are only
found in about a third of all messages. Yet, it is the openly anti-European contributions to
discourse – those categorically opposing the principle of integration and possibly the
current institutional set-up and/or project – that remain rather marginal (6.7 per cent of all
evaluations). Clearly, the incomplete category of diffuse eurosceptic statements is the most
numerous, accounting for over half of all statements (see Table 2). This reflects the strongly
negative tone in the debates.
Table 2. Relative frequencies of different forms of EU polity evaluation
Form of polity evaluation Percentage
Complete Affirmative European 15.5
Status quo 10.4
Alter-European 4.6
Eurocritical 5.4
Pragmatic 0.1
Anti-European 6.7
Incomplete Diffuse eurosceptic 57.3
Total 100.0
N 1,134
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Aside from their unmistakably negative connotation, it is hard to establish in what sense
or direction the EU polity is contested by diffuse eurosceptic evaluations – that is, the
missing information resulting from addressing only one or two dimensions of integration
makes it impossible to determine into which of the six ‘full’ categories in our typology the
evaluation would fall. There is thus an inbuilt ambiguity in the negative evaluations of EU
legitimacy. Such diffuse euroscepticism could load onto either status quo (‘no more further
steps’), alter-European (‘a different Europe’) or eurocritical (‘not this Europe’) type of
arguments. This would assume some form of support for cooperation among European
nation-states despite the criticism voiced. Alternatively, eurosceptic contributions could
reflect anti-European (‘no Europe at all’) arguments, opposing any form of cooperation.
The problem is that the makers of those arguments simply do not provide sufficient
information about their preferences to allocate their contributions to one of these four
types.
The conclusion is that only a minority of communicated contributions in the public
sphere come close to the normative template of a ‘complete’ argument about transforming
the EU polity in terms of principle, institutional design and project. The majority of
contributions falls short of clarifying the context conditions for the validity of their argu-
ments, and they do not point at possible solutions. In other words, EU polity contestation
online predominantly spreads an under-specified critique of the EU and European inte-
gration.We are witnessing relatively unclear expressions of discontent, rather than precisely
formulated and substantiated evaluations of the EU polity. In other words, we only get a
little information about the kind of European polity that would be supported or which
characteristics of the EU, exactly, are opposed by the participants in the Internet.
Intensity of debate and convergence on euroscepticism
These total relative frequencies of different kinds of EU polity contestation provide a
general overview of the tone of the debate online, but they do not answer the question
whether politicisation functions to synchronise debates across Europe’s public spheres.
Figure 1 shows the intensity of debate on the EU polity in terms of the average amount of
evaluations per online article. Clearly, at the time of the 2009 EP election campaigns, the
EU polity was most contested in the United Kingdom with an average of a little over five
evaluations per article. We find the least intense debate in Greece, with hardly any evalu-
ations per article.4
On the one hand, these differences in the intensity of debate reflect the controversy of
the EU in the country in question. Countries that are known to be ‘awkward partners’ in the
European project – particularly the United Kingdom – feature much more intense EU
polity contestation than the ones where participation in European integration has long
remained unquestioned. Also, we see a residual of treaty ratification referendums in the
Netherlands and France where extensive debates about the legitimacy of the EU held in
2005 are to some extent replicated in the 2009 European election campaigns (cf. De Wilde
et al. 2013). On the other hand, the intensity of debate reflects the digital divide within
Europe in terms of the spread of Internet access and the extent to which Web 2.0 features
of interactive debate have penetrated society.Web 2.0 features were less diffused in Eastern
and Southern Europe at the time of analysis.
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Most interestingly, and against some of the predictions found in the literature (e.g.,
Moravcsik 2006), more politicisation in terms of intensity of debate does not mean more
euroscepticism. Rather, politicisation amplifies the diversity of arguments and justifications
of EU polity worth. If anything, as Figure 1 shows, the debate about Europe becomes more
specified as it becomes more intense as the percentage of diffuse eurosceptic evaluations
tends to be slightly lower in countries with a higher average of EU polity evaluations per
online article.
A gap between citizens and elites?
The next step in our analysis is to determine to what extent these online debates, diffuse
eurosceptic and varied in intensity as they are, reflect the alleged citizen–elite divide.
Interactive websites are ideal for studying this as citizens voluntarily leave comments on
news stories that often feature the arguments by political elites. Not only do we capture
similar units of analysis in terms of arguments, we capture them in direct communicative
confrontation with each other. On the one hand, we would expect elite voice to become
Figure 1. Intensity of debate and diffuse euroscepticism.
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dominant on professional news sites as governments and mainstream political parties retain
a strong position as main communicators about Europe. Citizens, on the other hand, could
be expected to dismiss the elite consensus on European integration. The predominantly
pro-European voice of elites, amplified by the media, could further create eurosceptic
counter-reactions (De Wilde & Trenz 2012). Euroscepticism could thus spread indepen-
dently of the mobilisation by political parties as a negative response of the audience to the
predominance of pro-European elite discourse. For these reasons, we are interested in
establishing whether political elites evaluate European integration and the EU differently
in online EP election campaigns than citizens do (see Table 3).
Our aggregated media data of mainstream professional news sites and political blogs
confirms the existence of a citizen–elite divide in media discourse on Europe. Political party
actors are clearly more prone to making pro-European arguments than are citizens and
contribute fewer diffuse eurosceptic arguments, as shown in Table 4. There is a clear
association between the actor and the type of evaluation advanced (χ2 (6, N =
1,022) = 66.530, p < 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.255). Still, it could be argued that these discursive
differences during the 2009 EP elections campaign are less pronounced than those reported
between national parliamentarians and voters during many of the referendums on treaty
change. The gap between citizens and elites may thus be decreasing or it may not be as
pronounced on the web as it is ‘offline’. There is thus partial evidence that expressions of
diffuse euroscepticism are reactions to pro-European elites. It is not necessarily made
visible through the inputs of eurosceptic parties but are, nevertheless, strong in citizens’
comments.
Justifying EU polity contestation
In the following, we distinguish how citizens and political elites evaluate the EU polity
differently by reference to the five broad categories of justifications of worth. We find a
substantial association between actors and justifications (χ2 (6, N = 1,023) = 84.111,
p < 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.287). Generally, party actors justify their legitimacy evaluations
Table 3. EU polity evaluations by party actors and citizens (%)
Actor
Polity contestation Party actor Citizens
Affirmative European 27.3 8.5
Status quo 7.8 10.6
Alter-European 5.5 4.1
Eurocritical 5.5 5.5
Pragmatic 0.0 0.1
Anti-European 6.5 7.3
Eurosceptic 47.4 63.9
Total 100.0 100.0
N 308 714
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less often than citizens. Citizens are also much more likely to evaluate the EU or European
integration based on a concern with democracy than party actors. The question is whether
this type of evaluation is mainly evoked in a legitimating (affirmative European) or in a
delegitimating (eurocritical or anti-European) context.
Table 5 shows first, how certain justifications in the context of EP election debates –
particularly those concerning democracy and necessity – are more often invoked than
others, irrespective of the type of argument made.5 There is a clear tendency in all countries
to criticise the EU in an electoral contest on the basis of alleged democracy deficits rather
than to support EU legitimacy by reference to democratic credentials. Actors making
supportive evaluations, in turn, tend to base their justifications on a ‘functional’ argumen-
tation grounding EU legitimacy in the necessity of its regulative framework or the safety
provided by it. Two other justifications of worth – culture and economic prosperity – are
invoked by both those positively and negatively evaluating the EU.
Discussion
Our findings point to the high visibility of online EU polity contestation as an element of
EP election campaigning that is partly detached from partisan contestation. Our discussion
of polity contestation in the context of the 2009 EP election campaigns supports the notion
that politicisation functions to diffuse both positive and negative evaluations as well as a
range of justifications of the EU across different public spheres, hence featuring more
intensity of debate and polarisation of opinion without fragmenting the audiences. Discur-
sive efforts to establish EU legitimacy in terms of principle, institutional set-up and project
evoke transformative counter arguments and vice versa.
We find that EU polity contestation during the 2009 EP election campaigns predomi-
nantly concerns the current institutional set-up of the EU. There are fewer evaluations
concerning the future project of integration and even less evaluations of the principle of
integration. This is reflected in a dominance of diffuse eurosceptic contributions to the
Table 4. Justifications by actor type (%)
Justification of worth
Actor
Party actor Citizens
Democracy 20.1 43.4
Culture 9.7 4.8
Necessity 6.5 12.5
Economic prosperity 6.8 8.1
Safety 7.8 4.5
Other 1.0 0.3
Not applicable 48.1 26.5
Total 100.0 100.0
N 308 714
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debate, as opposed to more complete EU polity evaluations.The lack of contestation on the
principle of integration may point to general acceptance among European political elites
and citizens that some form of collaboration is warranted among European nation-states,
given their economic interdependencies and historical relations. Future research should
investigate whether this motivation indeed lies behind a lack of salience of this dimension
of EU polity evaluation. Furthermore, after the anticipated completion of the ratification of
the Treaty of Lisbon, grand-scale future plans for further integration may have (tempo-
rarily) disappeared from the public agenda. The strong criticism of the current institutional
set-up of the EU, in combination with a lack of contestation on the project of integration,
implies a stalemate in which polity opposition frequently remains detached from a discus-
sion on possible reform.Whereas the principle of integration is largely evaluated positively,
the current set-up of the EU is largely evaluated negatively. Evaluations on the project
differ and views on future integration diverge among countries.
Our online discourse data supports the presence of a citizens–elite divide, which is
regularly considered as one of the central vectors structuring public opinion on European
integration. Citizens express themselves clearly as more critical of the EU than party actors,
with party actors making more affirmative European arguments and citizens making more
diffuse eurosceptic arguments.We also find evidence of the divide between party actors and
citizens in terms of justification, with citizens expressing a clear concern with democracy
and partisan actors being only partly responsive to these concerns and, in general terms,
justifying their arguments less frequently. Concerns with democracy expressed mainly by
citizens are furthermore mostly evoked in a negative (delegitimising) context, while justi-
fications relating to necessity and safety, expressed predominantly by party actors, are used
to support the EU. In an electoral contest, such a citizens–elite divide can be interpreted as
a gap in representation. Although these differences between citizens and elites are
observed in our study, the alleged divide appears less pronounced than often described in
the literature. Further research should investigate whether there is offline evidence of a
persistent, yet reduced, citizen–elite divide too.
Interestingly, the content of evaluations does not vary substantially among the countries
involved in our study. Rather, what differs is the intensity of debate as measured in the
amount of polity evaluations. In the United Kingdom, Austria and the Netherlands, where
European integration is more salient and public opinion is more critical, we find a higher
amount of polity evaluations. In contrast, Greece and Hungary, where European integra-
tion was relatively uncontroversial up until the outbreak of the euro crisis, feature few
evaluations. This draws our attention to the logics of polity opposition (Mair 2005, 2007).
Media debates on the EU as a polity are predominantly driven by those critical or dissat-
isfied with the political status quo, as in political debates in general (Gamson 1968: 48). In
other words, there is a bias in online media that favours opposition over affirmative voice.
Reasons for this are manifold. Negative news is often found to have a higher news value and
journalists as the gatekeepers of media discourse tend to selectively amplify discontent with
European integration. In addition, actors supportive of European integration and content
with the status quo have fewer incentives to voice their opinions online than do disgruntled
actors. Especially citizens, who mainly account for the high salience of diffuse eurosceptic
evaluations in the media, display a strong bias towards expressions of dissatisfaction with
the EU and European integration. In this sense, we can conclude that online media tends
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to amplify diffuse euroscepticism while pro-European arguments are less likely to become
salient on the Internet.
All this constitutes a major challenge to those who would like to transform the EU while
taking public opinion about the EU polity seriously. Clearly, the dominance of diffuse
euroscepticism and citizens’ explicit concern with the democratic credentials of the Union
supports those who wish to proceed with a transformative agenda. Yet, while this study
provides evidence of a convergence across Europe in terms of prominent diffuse
euroscepticism and replication of conflicts over the principle of integration, the institutional
set-up of the EU and the future project of integration, little information is provided by the
participants of online debates about what would alleviate their discontent. To return to our
initial question, we thus find little evidence of the potential for legitimation through
politicisation in online public spheres. Although there is no shortage of opinions about the
EU in the online media spheres we have examined, the predominant opinion (diffuse
euroscepticism) is too vague to allow implementation of reforms.There appears substantial
consensus that the current EU set-up is not satisfactory, but the legitimate way forward is
not voiced publicly in a clear enough manner.
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Notes
1. Although not all citizens follow political debates online and few actively participate in them, the Internet
as a medium for political communication is of growing importance. Still, we should be careful not to
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assume that citizens participating in online political debates form a representative sample of the popu-
lation. They tend to be young, male and highly educated in comparison to the population at large
(Albrecht 2006; Norris 2001).
2. See the Online Appendix for more detailed information about the data and sampling.
3. Whether EU public contestation is comprised largely of justified or non-justified statements is certainly
relevant if we are to assess the deliberative quality of discussions on EU issues. Such an endeavour is,
however, outside the scope of this article.
4. Note that our data stems from before the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis; political debate
about the EU polity in Greece may well have increased since then.
5. It is not surprising to find frequent justifications concerning democracy during EP election campaigns
since this is a key democratic moment. However, the prominence of ‘democracy’ as economy of worth in
the debate and its more frequent usage by those making more critical evaluations of the EU remain.
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